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X Sec 6 S. Vietnam

X Ag 3 John RICHARDSON

X Ag 3 Edward V. LANSDALE

Madame Nhu and the State Dept.

In many intangible ways, Madame Nhu's trip to America has bolstered her country's position vis-a-vis the Kennedy Administration. The Vietnamese lady won over some skeptical newsmen in the "lion's mouth," as she chose to call the Nation's Capital. But she has also made a deep and favorable impression with the American public, which counts heavily in this politically attuned Administration.



Zealous official attempts to discredit her have not all paid off. The Viet Nam Embassy reports letters were running 3 to 2 against her before her arrival. Since her coming, Madame Nhu has received over 5,000 letters, 95 per cent favorable.

Her obviously cordial reception at Fordham and Georgetown universities, both Catholic institutions of learning, also did not go unnoticed by the Administration's astute political advisers. (Cardinals Cushing and Spellman were reportedly instrumental in persuading the President two years ago to take his initial firm stand against the Communists in Viet Nam.)

The controversial beauty, furthermore, brought some cheering news, which *Human Events* has since confirmed through both military sources and the State Department.

Within the past six months, some 10,000 Viet Cong Reds—over half, hard-core guerrillas—have defected to South Viet Nam. This report clashes sharply with liberal news sources, which have created the impression the military situation for the free Vietnamese had badly deteriorated since the "Buddhist affair."

Despite these outwardly optimistic signs, the State Department has set in motion a series of policies which could paralyze the entire war effort. Roger Hilsman, a top department official; Paul Kattenburg, head of the Vietnamese desk in Washington and once close to the Institute of Pacific Relations crowd; and William Trueheart, No. 2 man in Saigon, are reliably reported to be pushing such policies.

Allegedly, the "squeeze" is designed to force Diem to reform his regime. In truth, it has hampered the war effort and poisoned the working relationship between Diem and the U.S. government—a tandem now winning the war against the Reds.

Economic cuts, resulting in serious fuel and food shortages; a verbal assault against the Diem regime by the United States Information Service; withdrawal of funds for the internal security forces—all are part of the department's pressuring tactics.

The recall of John Richardson, the CIA chief in Saigon friendly to Diem, and the Administration's recent sidelining of Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, are also considered damaging to Viet Nam's morale. Lansdale, now a chief target of liberal newsmen, was one of the influential Pentagon policy makers who swung like behind Diem back in 1954.

What particularly alarms Asian observers here is that Vietnamese policies smack of the same old State Department pattern. The American government lays down a clear-cut anti-Communist policy, implements it, then the State Department gets into the act. Thus fell the anti-Communist governments of Chiang Kai-shek in China and Phoumi Nosavan in Laos.

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Reunifying Vietnam

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General de Gaulle is probably right. Unless Vietnam is reunified, the chances of bringing order and prosperity there will be slim. Yet the US has no program - nor indeed even any hope - for reunifying the country. Back in 1954, when the French pulled out, many observers expected unity under Ho Chi Minh within a year or two. The Viet Minh was established in the industrial North which had traditionally dominated the sleepy rural South. Having defeated the French, Ho and his colleagues were accepted by most Vietnamese as the legitimate heirs to the colonial regime. There was, of course, a rump regime in the South, under the discredited puppet-king, Bao Dai. But nobody expected him to survive more than a few months. When he collapsed the Communist-led Viet Minh would take over. Even if he did not collapse, the Geneva Conference had hopefully recommended national elections within 18 months, and in the unlikely event that they actually took place, Ho and the Viet Minh were expected to win.

The US Ambassador to Bao Dai's regime, General J. Lawton Collins, recommended a hands-off policy, since he thought the situation hopeless. The CIA man in Saigon, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, dissented. If we backed Ngo Dinh Diem, he said, this remarkable man might pull off the impossible and establish a stable and permanent regime in Saigon. Lansdale persuaded his boss Allen Dulles; Allen persuaded his brother John Foster; and the US committed itself. For a while it looked as if the commitment had been a wise one. Diem showed extraordinary political gifts in crushing his innumerable opponents, playing off one faction against another, mixing promises with threats, exploiting both fear and vanity. He even won tacit acceptance from some former members of the Viet Minh, still numerous in the South.

Unfortunately, the balmy days of success did not last long. Politics is a combination of force, cunning and myth-making, and in this latter department Diem proved inadequate. It was not just that he lacked the common touch and could not evoke enthusiasm among the peasants who compose the bulk of the Southern population. More important, he never persuaded the bulk of the Vietnamese, either North or South of the 17th Parallel, that he was in Saigon to stay. If Southerners had believed the Saigon government permanent, they would have sought influence within it. Only the fanatics would have endured the hardship and danger of fighting with the Viet Cong in the maquis if the fight looked hopeless. But it didn't. Conversely, if the North Vietnamese had believed Diem likely to survive, they would

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Morse Urges U.S. Change Policy in South Vietnam ...

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A WHITEWASH CAM-

PAIGN was launched Monday in Washington in a desperate attempt to clear the State Department and the Pentagon of complicity in the savage assaults on Buddhists in South Vietnam and to prepare the way for replacing the dictatorship of President Ngo Dinh Diem with a dictatorship of South Vietnamese generals.

The White House hopes to control such a government through the 12 U.S. generals there who are backed up by 3,000 American troops and \$1,000,000 a day in expenditures.

The latest switch in State Department policy was predicted by Senator Wayne Morse (D-Ore) on Aug. 23 when he said that a change from "the dictatorship of Diem to a dictatorship of the military" appeared to be in the making.

This is the course that the State Department announced publicly three days later.

The latest policy switch was given on Monday to the press by Richard I. Phillips, State Department spokesman.

The statement declared that contrary to previous information the State Department was now convinced that the murderous raids on the Buddhist pagodas last week were carried out by the special security police, that the South Vietnamese army knew nothing of the raids, and that the generals had supported martial law, under which scores of persons have been brutally assaulted and jailed, only because the generals thought this would quiet the situation and help the anti-communist war effort.

The purpose of the statement, as the Washington correspondents reported frankly, was to rehabilitate the generals in the eyes of the world, preparatory to installing them as dictators.

Officials in Washington, *Times*, "stressed that the examination of the military chiefs had become the principal United States propaganda line."

The State Department state-


'Restlessness'

A "RESTLESSNESS" is "developing at the grassroots of America in respect to foreign policy," Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore) told the Senate on Aug. 23.

Morse called, especially, for popular intervention around the Vietnam where, he warned, America is being compromised by the secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. He declared:

"I say to the American people: 'You are long overdue in making your demands crystal clear to Republican and Democratic administrations that you want an end to the growing trend toward sanctioning a continuation of what amounts to police procedure in a democracy.'"

A few days earlier, on Aug. 19, he had called for a re-examination of U.S. foreign policy in relation to Germany. Both of these speeches deserve the consideration of the American people, we believe.



DEAN RUSK

ment represented also an attempt to avoid responding to the demands which Sen. Morse had

made Aug. 23 on the Senate floor.

After describing the situation in South Vietnam, Morse said:

"I now call upon the Secretary of State, from the floor of the U.S. Senate, to give me a memorandum setting forth the history, from the very beginning of our relationships with South Vietnam, of steps that were taken that resulted in our becoming involved in South Vietnam."

"I want to know from the the Secretary of State how we got into the plight we are in; why we have a commitment to support a tyrant in South Vietnam."

The time has come, "Morse continued," for the Secretary of State to prepare for the senior Senator from Oregon a thorough, detailed memorandum — containing a detailed account of the history of our participation in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

Morse declared that if it were not for U.S. aid President Diem would not have lasted 90 days ago, "a long time in the past."

U.S. support of the Diem regime, a "policy that has failed," "has cost us billions of dollars — and the loss of precious American lives," Morse said.

Morse put the spotlight on the shadowy figures of the Central Intelligence Agency who have been operating in South Vietnam. He acknowledged that neither he nor the other Senators knew what the CIA was doing.

Morse quoted newspaper articles by Homer Bigart, in the *New York Times*, and of Robert Karr McCabe, in the *New Leader*, describing the role played by Col. Edward G. Lansdale, chief CIA agent in South Vietnam.

The support of the U.S. was thrown behind Ngo Dinh Diem, the President's brother and chief hatchetman of the dictatorship, under the Eisenhower administration.

Allen Dulles, then head of the CIA, and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, supported Ngo Dinh Diem, on the advice of Lansdale, over the

opposition of the then U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Gen. J. Lawton Collins. When Frederick E. Nolting became U. S. ambassador two years ago he backed the Diem family to the hilt, on instructions from Washington.

Morse demanded that the operations of the CIA be barred. "It is difficult to speak on the floor of the Senate on what the CIA policy really was because its Senators cannot find out. However, it is the responsibility of Congress to find out."

"As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee I cannot tell the Senate — nor can any other member of the committee — what the facts are, about the CIA policy in South Vietnam or anywhere else in the world."

Congress, Morse declared, has given the CIA unchecked power, and has "permitted the CIA to continue to exercise what appears, in fact, to amount to a police power in a democracy."

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Chickens Come Home To Roost

Washington 'If' Dilemma

WASHINGTON — Another Central Intelligence Agency chicken is limping home to roost in Washington.

This time it comes from South Vietnam, where the massacre of Buddhists by the U.S.-backed Ngo regime has aroused revulsion throughout the world.

By Gordon Donaldson
Of The Toronto Telegram
News Service

The pattern is distressingly familiar to past events in Formosa, South Korea and Laos. The United States finds itself firmly committed to an outmoded, corrupt government whose only virtue is anti-Communism—at a price.

It was the CIA that boosted Ngo Dinh Diem to power in 1954, when Vietnam was partitioned after the French defeat in Indo-China.

The chief CIA agent, Col. E. G. Lansdale, recommended him to his boss, Allen Dulles. Dulles persuaded his brother, John Foster, at the time secretary of state, that Diem was the man to resist the Communists in North Vietnam.

John Foster Dulles took this advice and rejected that of his own ambassador general, J. L. Collins, who wanted to withhold recognition from President Diem.

Since 1959, Diem has been fighting a nasty, inconclusive little war with Vietcong Communist guerrillas. The U.S. has been paying for the war, \$250,000,000 a year, and sup-

plying 11,000 U.S. military "advisers." They are actually commando troops who lead the Vietnamese into action by helicopter.

On the CIA theory that the means justify the end, Washington played down reports that the Diem regime was unpopular at home.

U.S. aid money, squandered or stolen, was cheerfully written off.

For, since it was realized that the Laotians had no stomach for their own anti-Communist war, South Vietnam had become the last bastion of freedom in Indo-China.

Freedom, however, was not all it was supposed to be under the Ngo family rule.

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The president's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, ran a secret police force and spy network. His wife, "Dragon Lady" Madame Nhu, 38, built up her own army of female enforcers — the Women's Solidarity Movement, 1,200,000 strong — which keeps the Vietnamese men in order.

Her father, Tran Van Chuong, became ambassador to the United States.

Other Ngo brothers include the Roman Catholic archbishop of Hue, and the ambassador to Britain.

There have been plenty of internal crises under the Ngo family dictatorship. Until now Washington has dismissed them lightly as mere stomach-rumblings within a healthy Red-fighting ally.

This is no longer good enough.

Diem's police are raiding pagodas, arresting and shooting down Buddhist priests who march for religious freedom. The fiery suicides of monks and a nun, dismissed by Madame Nhu as a "Buddhist barbecue with imported gasoline" have shocked public opinion outside the tightly-censored little dictatorship.

Marital law has been declared, and now the telegraph offices built with U.S. money are closed to factual reporting.

U.S. Ambassador Frederick Nolting, who pleaded repeatedly "give Diem the benefit of the doubt," has been recalled to the States.

His replacement, Henry Cabot Lodge, is now making his first report to the state department. And Ambassador

Chuong has resigned, saying: "I have exhausted myself in counselling my government to adopt more democratic and tolerant methods."

Washington has condemned the repressive action of Diem and his police, and accused him of breaking his promise to get along with the Buddhists.

Now it is trying to decide what to do next.

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The war against the Vietcong has to go on. No suitable replacement for Diem is in sight. Even if there were one, the U.S. would have far more trouble getting Diem out than it had getting him in.

● If the U.S. cuts off aid to Diem and his army, the Communist Vietcong will take over.

● If the U.S. continues full support, it puts Roman Catholic President Kennedy on the side of the Roman Catholic Ngo family in its persecution of non-Christians.

In trying to make up its mind, the state department is now examining confused reports of a split between Diem and the Vietnamese army. Some say the army, and not Diem, is responsible for the anti-Buddhist terrorism; others that the army is planning to topple Diem and tame Madame Nhu, the beautiful shrew.

Most important, it is experiencing once again the lesson: In an ally, or a policy, anti-Communism is not enough.



MME. NHU
... female enforcer